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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY─PATENTS: 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS 
THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR PATENT INVALIDITY 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. CT. 2238 (2011) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the standard of proof for patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 
282, holding the presumption of patent validity must be overcome by clear 
and convincing evidence.  The Court recognized, while patent validity is 
ultimately a question of law, claims of invalidity rest on factual questions.  
The Court interpreted the statutory language of “presumed valid” with its 
common-law meaning, which specifies a heightened standard of proof for 
an accused infringer raising an invalidity defense and requires proof of the 
defense by clear and convincing evidence. 
Although the Court held the presumption of validity in § 282 requires 
proof of invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, the Court recognized a 
defendant’s burden of persuasion may be easier to sustain where new 
evidence was not disclosed to the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) during the examination.  The Court indicated a jury may be 
instructed on the effect of materially new evidence to consider whether an 
invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.  i4i 
endorsed the law as interpreted and applied by the Federal Circuit to affirm 
the heightened standard of proof for patent invalidity.  Nevertheless, the 
Court indicated jury instructions may assist a defendant claiming invalidity 
to sustain the burden of persuasion. 
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i4i developed and patented a method for editing computer documents 
containing markup codes by storing the document’s content separately from 
its markup codes.1  i4i’s method permits the editing of the markup codes in 
a document without the need to access the document’s content.2  In 2007, 
i4i sued Microsoft in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas, alleging Microsoft willfully infringed i4i’s patent through 
 
1. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011); see also Brief for 
Petitioner at 3-4, i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290) (explaining the method for editing computer 
documents).  “[A] markup language is a way of indicating how text should be displayed . . . on a 
computer screen.  For instance, <Para> is a computer markup code that indicates the start of a 
paragraph, and </Para> indicates the end of a paragraph.”  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3. 
2. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 4. 
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the manufacture and sale of certain Microsoft Word products.3  Microsoft 
denied infringement and counterclaimed by raising the affirmative defense 
of patent invalidity.4  Microsoft attempted to prove the sale, by i4i, of a 
software program known as S4 more than a year before filing the patent 
application violated the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), thus rendering 
the patent invalid.5 
While the parties agreed i4i had sold S4 in the United States more than 
a year before the patent application was filed, the parties disputed whether 
S4 practiced the claims of the patent.6  Since S4 was never disclosed to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) during the examination 
of i4i’s patent, Microsoft requested jury instructions providing Microsoft’s 
burden of proof with regard to its defense of invalidity based on prior art 
evidence not reviewed by the PTO is by preponderance of the evidence.7  
The district court provided jury instructions that did not contain Microsoft’s 
requested exception or that Microsoft had the burden of proving invalidity 
by clear and convincing evidence.8 
The jury found Microsoft willfully infringed i4i’s patent and Microsoft 
failed to prove its invalidity defense under the heightened standard.9  The 
jury awarded i4i $200,000,000 in damages.10  The district court denied 
Microsoft’s post-trial motions, including a motion for new trial on the basis 
of improper instruction regarding the evidentiary standard and a motion for 
post-verdict judgment as a matter of law on invalidity or, alternatively, a 
motion for a new trial based on the sale of S4 violating the on-sale bar.11  
The district court granted i4i’s motion for a permanent injunction against 
Microsoft.12  The district court awarded an additional $40,000,000 in 
 
3. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 572-73 (E.D. Tex. 2009). i4i 
alleged, when a file containing custom XML was opened with Word, Word would separate the 
custom XML markup codes from the content and would store the markup codes in the manner 
claimed by the 449 Patent.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 4. 
4. i4i, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
5. Id. at 584. The on-sale bar prevents patent entitlement if “the invention was patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this 
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”  35 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2007). 
6. i4i, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 584. 
7. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011).  A party with the burden 
of proof may satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof if that party can “place in the 
ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly 
probable,’” rather than merely more probable than not.  Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 
316 (1984). 
8. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2244. 
9. Id. 
10. i4i, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
11. Id. at 582-83. 
12. Id. at 598, 602. 
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enhanced damages due to Microsoft’s litigation misconduct and added 
$37,097,032 and $165,162 per day for the period of time between the jury’s 
verdict and the final judgment in prejudgment interest and post-verdict 
damages.13 
Microsoft appealed the decision of the district court to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.14  On appeal, Microsoft 
raised numerous issues, including whether the standard of proof provided in 
the jury instructions should have been lowered based on prior art which was 
not before the PTO, whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find 
the patent was not invalidated by the sale of S4, and whether corroboration 
was required to deny Microsoft’s motions based on the on-sale bar.15  The 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, confirming its settled interpret-
ation of § 282, which provides the standard of proving invalidity is by 
“clear and convincing evidence.”16  Because the burden was still on 
Microsoft to show by clear and convincing evidence S4 practiced the 
method claimed in i4i’s patent, the court of appeals held the jury’s findings 
of patent validity were supported by sufficient evidence.17  The court of 
appeals recognized corroboration is required of “any witness whose 
testimony alone is asserted to invalidate a patent,”18 but held corroboration 
is not required “for inventor testimony asserted to defend against a finding 
of invalidity by pointing to deficiencies in the prior art.”19 
Microsoft filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the United States 
Supreme Court granted.20  The Supreme Court, in turn, affirmed the Federal 
Circuit’s decision, holding the statutory presumption of validity in 35 
U.S.C. § 282 requires a defendant raising an invalidity defense to prove 
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.21  Further, the Supreme Court 
held the standard of proof remains unaltered even where evidence before 
the factfinder was never disclosed to the PTO during the examination.22  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court suggested several jury instructions that an 
accused infringer may request to satisfy the burden of persuasion.23 
 
13. Id. at 596-98. 
14. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
15. Id. at 847-48. 
16. Id. at 848. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 847 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 
1354, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
19. Id. 
20. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2238 (2011). 
21. Id. at 2244-53. 
22. Id. at 2249-51. 
23. Id. at 2251. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Patent Act of 1952 is silent on the standard of proof applicable to 
an invalidity defense.24  The Supreme Court had, however, established a 
common-law standard of proof even before the 1952 amendments to the 
Patent Act.25  The standard articulated by the Court in 1934 required proof 
“by clear and cogent evidence.”26  Even though the standard of proof is 
invariable, the presumption of validity may be weakened by new material 
evidence never considered by the PTO during the examination process.27 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
The Patent Clause states, “Congress shall have [p]ower . . . [t]o 
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited 
[t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their [r]espective 
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”28  In 1790, Congress enacted the first Patent 
Act, which laid the foundations of the modern American patent system.29  
In the current language of the Patent Act, Congress has vested in the PTO 
the authority to examine patent applications and to issue patents.30  To be 
patentable, a claimed invention must be of patentable subject matter, useful, 
novel, and non-obvious.31 
A patent grants a patentee an exclusive right to the invention for a 
limited period of time.32  The patentee has the ability to enforce exclusion-
ary rights by bringing an action for infringement against another person 
who makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell the patented invention without the 
authorization of the patentee.33  However, an alleged infringer may assert 
the invalidity of the patent as a defense.34  Section 282 of the Patent Act 
provides, in relevant part, that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid . . . . The 
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest 
on the party asserting such invalidity.”35  The section was enacted as part of 
 
24. See id. at 2246. 
25. Id. at 2249-50. 
26. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934). 
27. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2250-51. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
29. 1790 Patent Act, ch. 7, §§ 1-7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-12 (1790) (current version at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 2(a)(1), 131 (2007)). 
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(1), 131. 
31. Id. §§ 101-03. 
32. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
33. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also id. § 281. 
34. Id. § 282(2). 
35. Id. § 282. 
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the Patent Act of 1952.36  Section 282 establishes, by its express terms, a 
presumption of patent validity.37 
A defendant claiming invalidity must prove the patent did not satisfy 
one of the conditions for patentability.38  The on-sale bar precludes patent 
protection for any “invention . . . on sale in this country, more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent.”39  The evaluation of these 
statutory conditions as a matter of law requires the PTO to make factual 
determinations during the examination of a patent application.40  The fact-
ual questions relevant to determine patentability during the examination are 
the same questions presented to the factfinder in establishing proof of 
invalidity in an infringement action.41 
The statute is silent, however, on the applicable standard of proof.42  
Under the Federal Circuit’s long-standing interpretation of the patent 
invalidity defense, a defendant claiming invalidity must overcome the 
presumption of validity by clear and convincing evidence.43 
B. COMMON LAW PRECEDENT 
Even before the 1952 amendments to the Patent Act, in which 
Congress codified the presumption of validity, the United States Supreme 
Court established a common law presumption of validity and an adjoining 
heightened standard of proof.44  In Radio Corp. of America v. Radio 
Engineering Laboratories (RCA),45 the United States Supreme Court first 
articulated a standard relative to the burden of persuasion.46  The Supreme 
Court held the presumption gave “force” to the validity of the patent, and an 
alleged infringer attacking the validity of a patent “fair upon its face” bore a 
heavy burden of persuasion, which required “more than a dubious 
preponderance.”47  The Supreme Court defined the standard of persuasion 
as requiring proof “by clear and cogent evidence.”48  The Supreme Court 
further held “[a] patent regularly issued, and even more obviously a patent 
 
36. B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A 
Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 378 (2008). 
37. 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
38. See id. § 282(2)-(3). 
39. Id. § 102(b); see, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998). 
40. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011). 
41. Id. at 2243. 
42. Id. at 2245. 
43. Id. at 2243. 
44. Id. at 2249-50. 
45. 293 U.S. 1 (1934). 
46. RCA, 293 U.S. at 2. 
47. Id. at 7-8. 
48. Id. at 2. 
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issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants, is presumed to be valid until 
the presumption has been overcome by convincing evidence of error.”49 
The Federal Circuit utilizes the “clear and convincing” evidence 
standard in invalidity defenses, in unenforceability defenses based on 
inequitable conduct and willful infringement, and in support of an award of 
attorneys’ fees in infringement cases.50  Since shortly after its creation, the 
Federal Circuit applied the heightened standard of proof to invalidity 
challenges.51  In American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc. 
(AmHoist),52 Judge Rich, a principal drafter of the 1952 Patent Act, relied 
on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in RCA to conclude the 
burden of proving invalidity is by clear evidence.53 
C. LACK OF VARIABILITY IN THE STANDARD OF PROOF UNDER THE 
COMMON LAW RULE 
None of the United States Supreme Court cases dating before 1952 
indicated, even in dicta, any express limitation to the application of the 
heightened standard of proof codified in § 282.54  In RCA, the heightened 
standard of proof applied even where evidence before the factfinder was 
“different” from the evidence considered by the PTO.55  In AmHoist, the 
United States Supreme Court indicated the burden is “constant and never 
changes,” but new material evidence as to the validity of a patent may 
instead “carry more weight” in proving invalidity than evidence previously 
considered by the PTO.56  Concomitantly, the presumption of validity may 
be “weakened” or “dissipated” where evidence was never considered by the 
PTO during the examination process.57  In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex 
 
49. Id. at 7. 
50. Daniel, supra note 36, at 372-73. 
51. See, e.g., Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
52. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
53. AmHoist, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
54. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2250 (2011); see Mumm v. Jacob E. 
Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171 (1937) (“Not only is the burden to make good this defense 
upon the party setting it up, but his burden is a heavy one, as it has been held that every reasonable 
doubt should be resolved against him.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Hall, 301 
U.S. 216, 233 (1937) (“[T]he heavy burden of persuasion . . . rests upon one who seeks to 
negative novelty in a patent by showing prior use.”); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. 120, 124 (1873). 
55. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934). 
56. AmHoist, 725 F.2d at 1360; see also SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 
225 F.3d 1349, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“While the presentation at trial of a reference that was 
not before the examiner does not change the presumption of validity, the alleged infringer’s 
burden may be more easily carried because of this additional reference.”). 
57. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2250; see Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. v. Berkeley Pump Co., 191 F.2d 632, 634 
(9th Cir. 1951) (“largely dissipated”); Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Cliff Weil Cigar Co., 107 F.2d 
105, 107 (4th Cir. 1939) (“greatly weakened”); H. Schindler & Co. v. C. Saladino & Sons, 81 
F.2d 649, 651 (1st Cir. 1936) (“weakened”). 
          
408 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:401 
(KSR),58 the United States Supreme Court indicated the deference provided 
the PTO is diminished where material prior evidence was not before the 
PTO.59 
III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.60  The majority 
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding the statutory presumption 
of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 requires a defendant raising an invalidity 
defense to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.61  Justice 
Breyer filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia and 
Alito.62  Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.63  
Chief Justice Roberts took no part in the decision.64 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership,65 the United States Supreme 
Court analyzed (1) the standard of proof applicable to an alleged infringer 
claiming patent invalidity under § 282;66 (2) the effect of new material 
evidence before the factfinder but not before the PTO during the examin-
ation on the standard of proof;67 and (3) policy arguments relating to the 
heightened standard of proof allegedly unduly insulating “bad” patents from 
invalidity challenges.68  The Court relied on RCA, AmHoist, and other 
cases69 to conclude an alleged infringer’s burden of persuasion in an 
invalidity defense must be by clear and convincing evidence.70  The clear 
and convincing standard was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as the only 
standard of proof applicable to an invalidity defense, regardless of whether 
the evidence before the factfinder was before the PTO during the examin-
ation process.71  Consistent with requiring a heightened standard of proof, 
the presumption of validity may be weakened, and the burden of proving 
 
58. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
59. KSR, 550 U.S. at 426. 
60. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2242. 
61. Id. at 2252-53. 
62. Id. at 2253. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
66. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2243. 
67. Id. at 2249-50. 
68. Id. at 2251-52. 
69. E.g., Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171 (1937); Smith v. Hall, 301 
U.S. 216, 233 (1937); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. 120, 124 (1873). 
70. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2242. 
71. Id. at 2250. 
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invalidity may be easier to sustain in circumstances indicating the PTO 
never considered the evidence.72  The Supreme Court suggested several jury 
instructions that an accused infringer may request to satisfy the burden of 
persuasion.73 
1. The Evidence Standard for Patent Invalidity 
The Supreme Court first considered Microsoft’s argument that § 282 
does not impose a heightened standard of proof for patent invalidity and the 
appropriate standard is by a preponderance of the evidence.74  For 
Microsoft, § 282 did not codify a heightened standard of proof in the 
enactment of a presumption of validity.75  Microsoft based its assumption 
on the rationale that the presumption of validity, by itself, does not allocate 
the burden of proof or impose a specific standard of proof.76  Congress 
explicitly allocated the burden of proof in the statute but declined to include 
a particular standard of proof.77  In Microsoft’s view, if Congress had 
intended to codify a heightened standard of proof, it would have done so 
explicitly.78 
The Supreme Court conceded the statute explicitly specified the party 
bearing the burden of proof but did not enunciate the applicable evidentiary 
standard of proof.79  However, the Supreme Court rejected Microsoft’s 
arguments and refused to treat the presumption as a procedural device that 
would only shift the burden of production or shift both the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion.80  Instead, the Supreme Court held 
the presumption allocates the burden of proof and specifies the burden of 
persuasion.81 
The Supreme Court established “presumed valid” as a common law 
term with a common law meaning.82  The Supreme Court relied on 
principles of statutory construction to hold Congress intended to adopt the 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 2251. 
74. Id. at 2244. 
75. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 19. 
78. Id. 
79. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245.  “Standard of proof” refers to “the degree of certainty by which 
the factfinder must be persuaded of a factual conclusion to find in favor of the party bearing the 
burden of persuasion,” whereas “burden of persuasion” and “burden of proof” are used inter-
changeably to identify the party who must persuade the jury in its favor to prevail.  Id. at 2245 n.4. 
80. Id. at 2247. 
81. Id. at 2246. 
82. Id.; see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007) (“[A] common law 
term in a statute comes with a common-law meaning, absent anything pointing another way.”). 
          
410 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:401 
settled meaning under the common law because the statute did not indicate 
any other evidentiary standard.83  The common law presumption was 
subsumed in the Supreme Court’s decision in RCA, and according to the 
settled meaning of the common law presumption, an alleged infringer 
raising an invalidity defense had a heightened burden of proof requiring an 
invalidity defense to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.84 
The Supreme Court declined Microsoft’s contention that Congress 
intended to depart from the settled meaning simply because Congress did 
not specify the heightened standard of proof in the statute.85  On the 
contrary, the Supreme Court held Congress intended to incorporate the 
settled meaning under the common law by omitting to specify a different 
evidentiary standard.86  The Court reasoned Congress’ choice of a standard 
of proof controls “absent ‘countervailing constitutional constraints.’”87 
In the alternative, Microsoft argued the heightened standard of proof 
only applied to cases involving oral testimony of prior invention88 and cases 
based on priority of invention where the priority issue had previously been 
litigated in an inter partes89 proceeding before the PTO,90 but not invariably 
in all cases involving an invalidity defense.91  The Supreme Court 
dismissed Microsoft’s argument by stating case law did not indicate any 
explicit or inherent limitation on the application of the heightened standard 
of proof.92  Microsoft also argued the heightened standard attributed to the 
presumption of validity renders superfluous the statutory language allocat-
ing the burden of proof to the party asserting invalidity because the height-
 
83. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246-47; see NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) 
(“Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the 
established meaning of these terms.”). 
84. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245-46; Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 
(1934). 
85. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 2244 (quoting Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981)). 
88. See, e.g., T.H. Symington Co. v. Nat’l Malleable Castings Co., 250 U.S. 383, 386 (1919); 
Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Beat ‘Em All Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 284 (1892) (“The 
Barbed Wire Patent”). 
89. “Inter partes reexamination is a [PTO] administrative proceeding to challenge the validity 
of patents that have already issued.”  MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION § 1:2 
(2011).  Only a third-party may file an inter partes request.  See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2007).  The 
third-party requester is estopped in any further civil action from asserting invalidity of any claim 
where the issues could have been raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings.  See id. 
§ 311(c). 
90. See, e.g., Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1 (1934); Morgan v. 
Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1894). 
91. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2247. 
92. Id. at 2247-48. 
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ened standard would have identified the party required to overcome the 
presumption.93  For Microsoft, the most consistent interpretation of § 282 is 
to construe the presumption of validity as allocating the burden of 
production, or both the burden of production and the burden of persua-
sion.94 
While the Court recognized effect must be given “to every clause and 
word of a statute,” the Court concluded there existed no interpretation that 
avoided excess language.95  The Supreme Court reasoned, if the presump-
tion was simply a shifting mechanism to allocate the burden of production, 
the statutory language stating “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a 
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity” 
would be superfluous.96  The Court reconciled the apparent tension between 
the superfluous language of the statute and the canon against superfluity by 
conceding excess language is “hardly unusual” in statutes involving a 
presumption, a burden of persuasion, and a standard of proof.97 
2. The Effect of Evidence Never Considered by the PTO 
Microsoft argued in the alternative, claiming even if the presumption of 
validity was interpreted as imposing a heightened standard of proof, a 
preponderance standard of proof is appropriate where prior art before the 
factfinder was not considered by the PTO during the examination.98  
Microsoft presented numerous cases where the presumption of validity was 
“diminished,”99 “absent,”100 or “weakened”101 in such circumstances.102  
Despite accepting the veracity of Microsoft’s proposition, the Supreme 
 
93. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9. 
94. Id. at 21-22. 
95. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2248 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)). 
96. Id.; see 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
5122, at 401 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]he same party who has the burden of persuasion also starts out 
with the burden of producing evidence.”). 
97. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2249; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006). 
98. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2249. 
99. See KSR v. Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007) (“[T]he rationale underlying 
the presumption—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much 
diminished.”); Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Sample, 130 F. 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1904) (“[T]he force of 
that presumption is much diminished, if not destroyed, by the lack of any reference by the 
Examiner to, or consideration of, the . . . patents.”). 
100. See Nordell v. Int’l Filter Co., 119 F.2d 948, 950 (7th Cir. 1941) (“[T]here can be no 
presumption of validity over . . . prior art which the Examiner did not note.”); Nat’l Elec. Prods. 
Corp. v. Grossman, 70 F.2d 257, 258 (2d Cir. 1934) (“[P]resumption of validity does not extend 
beyond the record before the [e]xaminer.”). 
101. See, e.g., Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Cliff Weil Cigar Co., 107 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 
1939); Butler Mfg. Co. v. Enter. Cleaning Co., 81 F.2d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 1936). 
102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 33-34. 
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Court declined to view the cases cited by Microsoft as creating a different 
standard of proof than in cases where the evidence before the factfinder is 
different from the evidence before the PTO.103  Instead, the Court advanced 
the proposition that, although the evidentiary standard remains unaltered, 
the deference given the PTO “may lose significant force,” and the alleged 
infringer’s burden of proving invalidity “may be easier to sustain.”104 
Accordingly, the Court indicated jury instructions on the effect of new 
evidence should be provided when the PTO does not have all material fact 
during the examination.105  Specifically, the Supreme Court indicated, when 
warranted, a jury may be instructed on (1) whether evidence of invalidity 
was not considered by the PTO during the examination, (2) whether the 
new evidence was material to the validity of the patent, and (3) the effect of 
materially new evidence when determining whether an alleged infringer has 
proved invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.106  Microsoft argued a 
jury instruction specifying S4 was never before the PTO was warranted, but 
the Supreme Court refused to consider the argument because Microsoft 
never requested an instruction to that effect.107 
3. Concerns About the Issuance of “Bad” Patents 
The United States Supreme Court refused to weigh the strength of the 
policy arguments raised by the parties and the amici.108  The Court left to 
Congress the responsibility of addressing any criticism with regard to the 
PTO issuing “bad” patents insulated from invalidity challenges because of 
the heightened standard of proof.109  The Court observed Congress has on 
many occasions amended § 282 and other parts of the Patent Act but has 
never considered lowering the standard of proof adopted in § 282.110 
B. CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE BREYER 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, emphasizing the clear and 
convincing standard of proof applied to factual questions but not to 
 
103. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2249-51. 
104. Id. at 2251; see Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating new material evidence as to the validity of a patent may instead “carry 
more weight” in proving invalidity than evidence previously considered by the PTO); cf. KSR, 550 
U.S. at 427. 
105. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251. 
106. Id. 
107. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 
51(d)(1)(B). 
108. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2252. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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questions involving the application of the law to the facts or the ultimate 
legal question of patent validity.111  For Justice Breyer, applying the clear 
and convincing standard to questions of law may increase the risk of 
granting patent protection where none is due.112  Justice Breyer proposed 
using case-specific instructions to assist a jury in separating factual and 
legal questions of validity, or interrogatories and special instructions to help 
a jury isolate the facts and apply the correct standard to its legal conclu-
sions.113 
C. CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE THOMAS 
Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment and agreed the heightened 
standard of proof adopted in RCA applied to invalidity defenses because the 
specific standard adopted in the common law had never been overruled or 
modified by Congress.114  Justice Thomas did not, however, share the 
majority’s contention that Congress’ use of the term “presumed valid” 
codified a standard of proof by borrowing a term of art.115  In his opinion, 
the lack of consistency in the case law prior to the adoption of the Patent 
Act of 1952 precluded the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt a 
term of art to which a particular standard of proof would attach.116 
IV. IMPACT 
The decision in i4i will affect the corrective role of the judiciary in 
reviewing patent eligibility determinations.117  The effect of the decision on 
insulating “bad” patents from judicial review remains uncertain,118 
particularly in light of the dissimilar procedures by which patents are 
issued.119  The number of amici briefs submitted in support of Microsoft 
demonstrated some amici expected the Supreme Court to provide for 
exceptions to the clear and convincing evidentiary standard for proving 
invalidity defenses depending on the circumstances surrounding the exam-
 
111. Id. at 2253 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
112. Id. 
113. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 49, 51. 
114. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2253 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Brief of Amicus Curiae William Mitchell College of Law Intellectual Property Institute 
in Support of Petitioner at 5-7, i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). 
118. Brief of EMC Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, i4i, 131 S. 
Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). 
119. Brief of Fédération Internationale Des Conseils En Propriété Industrielle as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 8-9, i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). 
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ination process.120  i4i was particularly important as the decision resulted in 
the largest patent infringement damages award to be upheld on appeal.121 
A. THE BURDEN OF PROVING INVALIDITY 
The clear and convincing standard of proof remains a hurdle difficult to 
overcome for defendants claiming invalidity as several cases since the i4i 
decision illustrate.122  One of the purposes of the Patent Act is to promote 
innovation.123  Microsoft and its amici expressed concerns over the applic-
ation of the clear and convincing standard as undermining innovation by 
insulating “bad” patents from invalidity challenges.124  In affirming the 
clear and convincing standard of proof for an alleged infringer who raises 
an invalidity defense, the Supreme Court unanimously declined to depart 
from the rule adopted in RCA, which the Court held was implicitly codified 
by Congress in the Patent Act of 1952.125  Through its decision, the Court 
sent a strong signal of affirmance by stating any modification to the 
standard of proof for invalidity defenses requires congressional action.126 
Congress is in a better position than the judiciary to comprehensively 
deal with policy concerns by assessing the impact of the current patent 
system and the result of changes to the patent system.127  Congress had 
previously addressed concerns over “bad” patents by amending the patent 
laws, including an expansion of the reexamination process to provide for 
inter partes proceedings.128  The limits set by Congress on the reexam-
 
120. See Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/microsoft-v-i4i-limited-partnership/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).  Forty-eight 
amicus briefs were submitted to the Court, including nineteen in support of petitioner.  Id. 
121. Abby Lauer, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship: Microsoft Asks the Supreme Court To 
Rule on the Evidentiary Standard for Patent Invalidity, JOLTDIGEST (Sept. 10, 2010), http://jolt. 
law.harvard.edu/digest/software/microsoft-corp-v-i4i-ltd-pship. 
122. See Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 296, 332 (D. Del. 2011) (holding defendant failed to prove invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence); Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 819-21  (E.D. Tex. 
2011) (holding defendants failed to rebut presumption of validity by clear and convincing 
evidence); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 409, 446-47 (E.D. Va. 
2011) (finding defendant had not shown invalidity by clear and convincing evidence). 
123. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
124. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011). 
125. Id. at 2243, 2252. 
126. Id. at 2252. 
127. Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Association of University 
Technology Managers, and CropLife International in Support of Respondents at 4-5, i4i, 131 S. 
Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). 
128. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2007). 
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ination process are construed to protect inventors’ and investors’ reliance 
interests.129 
Nearly five months after the i4i decision, Congress passed and 
President Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,130 “the 
most sweeping statutory changes to patent law in over half a century.”131  
The legislation will amend 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-19 to replace the current inter 
partes reexamination proceeding with an “inter partes review” proceed-
ing.132  The inter partes review proceeding will require the PTO to issue a 
final determination within one year of notice of review.133  The Act will 
also introduce a “post-grant review proceeding.”134  The post-grant review 
procedure is “one of the most significant changes in U.S. patent law called 
for by the Act.”135  The post-grant review proceeding will allow a public 
petitioner seeking review to raise in the PTO the same patentability issues 
as a defendant claiming invalidity in a patent infringement action.136 
Within a post-grant review proceeding, the PTO will be able to 
consider any basis for invalidity, including prior sale.137  In i4i, Microsoft 
and its amici argued the PTO procedural system shielded “bad” patents 
from some invalidity challenges, including the on-sale bar, which could not 
previously be raised in inter partes reexamination procedures.138  In a post-
grant review, the petitioner will have the burden of proving invalidity by a 
preponderance of the evidence.139  Although these procedures will be 
conducted before administrative patent judges, the rationale is that, unlike 
in litigation, a patent does not enjoy a presumption of validity during the 
post-grant review proceeding.140  On the other hand, a petitioner will be 
estopped from raising claims in civil court that the petitioner raised or 
 
129. Brief of Amici Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization, Association of University 
Technology Managers, And CropLife International in Support of Respondents, supra note 127, at 
2. 
130. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
131. Gregory N. Mandel, Keeping Current: Patents; Will America Reinvent Itself? Patent 
Reform in 2011, BUS. L. TODAY, Aug. 2011, at 1. 
132. Id. § 6 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-19). 
133. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11)). 
134. Id. § 7 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-29). 
135. Hayden W. Gregory, Post-Legislation Lawmaking: Where Rules Rule, 3 LANDSLIDE 1, 
55 (2011). 
136. Robert A. Armitage, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: The Once-Secret Patenting 
Process Grows More Public, 4 LANDSLIDE 1, 1 (2011) (discussing the post-grant review 
procedure). 
137. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, § 6(d) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)); see 
35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)-(3). 
138. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251-52 (2011). 
139. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, § 6(d) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 326(e)). 
140. Andrew L. Schaeffer, Parallel Patent Reexaminations:  The Poor Man’s Litigation, in 1 
PATENT LITIGATION 441, 454 (2011). 
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reasonably could have raised during the post-grant review.141  Accused 
infringers will have to strategically determine whether the post-grant review 
procedure is worth the risk of having the PTO confirm by a preponderance 
of the evidence the validity of the patent, in comparison to attempting to 
prevail in court under the clear and convincing standard.142 
B. RECOURSE FOR ALLEGED INFRINGERS 
The decision in i4i will disrupt the way invalidity defenses are litigated.  
In situations where the PTO never considered material prior art, a jury is 
not faced with having to defer to the PTO or disagree with its expertise.143  
The jury instructions proposed by the Supreme Court will allow new prior 
art or other invalidating evidence not considered by the PTO to reduce the 
deference due the PTO and carry more weight towards sustaining the 
defendant’s burden of persuasion.144 
An alleged infringer will certainly look at the perspective of claiming a 
diminished presumption of validity and will contemplate making use of the 
jury instructions suggested by the Supreme Court to meet the heightened 
standard of proof.145  Accordingly, if the parties dispute whether the 
evidence presented to the jury differs from the evidence previously before 
the PTO, an alleged infringer should consider requesting a jury instruction 
mandating the jury to consider that question.146  The defendant claiming 
invalidity may also seek an instruction to evaluate whether the evidence 
before the jury is materially new, as well as an instruction on the effect of 
new evidence not considered by the PTO.147 
The Supreme Court, however, left open the manner and circumstances 
in which those jury instructions should be requested by defendants or 
granted by judges.148  If properly applied, the jury instructions will enable 
juries to appropriately consider the evidence of invalidity and the burden of 
persuasion may be easier to sustain.149  Carefully tailored case-specific jury 
instructions will shield juries from the confusion resulting from the 
application of a dual standard of invalidity.150  Interrogatories and special 
 
141. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, § 6(d) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)). 
142. See Schaeffer, supra note 140. 
143. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
144. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corporation in Support of 
Neither Party at 32, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). 





150. Id. at 2253 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
          
2011] CASE COMMENT 417 
verdicts will alleviate Justice Breyer’s concerns involving a jury attempting 
to distinguish between questions of fact and questions of law, as the clear 
and convincing standard of proof is an evidentiary standard that applies 
only to questions of fact.151 
V. CONCLUSION 
In i4i, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the heightened 
standard of proof applicable to patent invalidity defenses under § 282.152  
An invalidity defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence 
even in cases where the evidence before the factfinder was never considered 
by the PTO.153  However, the Court indicated an alleged infringer’s burden 
of persuasion may be easier to sustain in such circumstances, and advised 
on requesting instructions asking for a jury to consider the effect of 
materially new evidence when determining whether an invalidity defense 




152. Id. at 2242 (majority opinion). 
153. Id. at 2251. 
154. Id. 
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